Conflict and Child Labor: Evidence from Poor Households in Colombia by Del Risco Bravo, Claudia Sofia
Conflict and Child Labor: Evidence from Poor
Households in Colombia
Claudia Sofia Del Risco Bravo
To cite this version:
Claudia Sofia Del Risco Bravo. Conflict and Child Labor: Evidence from Poor Households in
Colombia. Economies and finances. 2014. <dumas-01107729>
HAL Id: dumas-01107729
https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-01107729
Submitted on 21 Jan 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Conflict and Child Labor: Evidence from Poor
Households in Colombia
Sofia del Risco Bravo
6 June 2014
Abstract
Colombia suffers from one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, which is
believed to have had several consequences on the country’s economic and devel-
opment performance. This study uses measures of central government deterrence
effort as instruments of conflict to estimate the impact of conflict on children’s time
allocation to two different types of work: housework and work performed outside
the household for poor families living in small municipalities in Colombia. I find
that children living in highly affected by conflict municipalities are more likely to do
some kind of work, specially outside the household. Moreover, housework intensity
is significantly higher for girls living in this kind of municipalities.
1
1 Introduction
The social, economic and political consequences of violent conflict are tremendous. It
can destroy infrastructure and capital; it displaces people, endangers civil liberties, dis-
rupts schooling, and affects health (Justino 2011). Therefore, conflict is likely to change
households’ decisions in several aspects such as labor allocation and human capital ac-
cumulation. The later is a fundamental mechanism through which conflict can affect
long-term development and economic growth. Human capital destruction during child-
hood is a well documented mechanism leading to poverty traps, due to the severe long-run
effects it can have on individual and household welfare via future labor market outcomes
and economic performance of the affected children (Becker 1962, Mincer 1974, Shultz
1961). Negative effects of violent conflict on individual and household’s education level,
labor and health outcomes can be observed decades after the conflict ended (Alderman
et al. 2006, Akresh et al. 2009, Shemyakina 2011).
Schooling and child labor are usually the two options between which parents allocate
their children’s time. Although they are not necessarily exclusive, there may still be
substantial consequences of work for schooling attainment and performance. Several
studies have found a negative correlation between working and grade advancement, years
of completed education and test scores for Latin America (Orazem and Gunnarsson 2004,
1L’université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne n’entend donner aucune approbation, ni désapprobation
aux opinions émises dans ce mémoire; elles doivent être considérées comme propre à leur auteur.
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Psacharopoulos 1997). Moreover, even taking into account the endogeneity issue, there
is evidence of a negative relation between child labor and school attainment (Boozer and
Sari 2001, Beegle et al. 2004). Then, conflict may have and impact on both schooling
and child labor decisions, if it can change households’ decisions.
This study adds to the existing literature by estimating the effect of armed conflict
on child labor for poor households in Colombia. To do so, I use two panel data sets that
allow me to link household’s time allocation decisions with armed conflict intensity at the
municipality level. The identification strategy is the variation of conflict exposure both
across time and space. I estimate both the effect of conflict on the probability for a child
to work and the impact of conflict on the intensity of child labor, distinguishing between
two types of child labor: housework and work performed outside the household.
I use three different approaches to estimate the causal link between conflict and child
labor. The first one estimates the probability of working by using a dummy that dis-
tinguishes between highly affected by conflict municipalities and those less affected. The
second one exploits the panel structure by estimating an individual fixed effects model.
To control for possible endogeneity2, the third and preferred strategy estimates the two
previous models instrumenting conflict with lagged central government deterrence mea-
sures. Under this last approach, I find that conflict increases the likelihood but not the
intensity of child labor. For housework, conflict significantly increases both the likelihood
and the amount of time children, especially girls, dedicate to it. Finally, conflict increases
the likelihood child work outside the household but not the intensity of this type of job;
moreover the magnitude of this effect is greater for boys than for girls.
The rest of this document is divided as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature
review, Section 3 explains the data, Section 4 gives the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
There are three main channels through which conflict can affect child labor: indirectly by
creating negative income shocks, and changing returns to education, and directly through
soldiering.
Low household income levels have been seen as a determinant of child labor ever
since the seminal theoretical paper of Basu and Hoang Van (1998). This model shows
that child labor can occur assuming altruistic parents if household income is lower than a
subsistence level, i.e. children are used as an economic security mechanism, as reported in
the development economics literature (Dasgupta 1993, Nugent and Gillaspy 1983). There
is empirical evidence relating negative income shocks to increases in child labor (Beegle
et al. 2006, Duryea et al 2007, Jacoby and Skoufias 1997, Thomas et al. 2004). Now,
there are at least three ways in which conflict can create negative income shocks: lost of
property or increased probability of loosing property3, job loss4, and changes in family
2HRW more than 11000 children were fighting in Colombia’s armed conflict by 2003. Also, there is the
possibility of families self-selecting themselves into specific types of municipalities (on conflict) depending
on their risk taking preferences.
3For example, guerrilla and paramilitary groups use to charge a “security tax” to vast populations
depending on specific characteristics.
4Camacho and Rodriguez (2010) find that a one standard deviation in the number of guerrilla and
paramilitary attacks in a municipality increases the probability of firm exit in 8.1 percentage points.
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structure.5
Conflict can also change returns to education, affecting households’ child labor deci-
sions through three channels. First, education is a risky investment (Becker 1964, Levhari
and Weiss 1974) because of future labor markets uncertainty and the likelihood of young
adult death. Estevan and Baland (2007) develop a theoretical model that shows how
high young adult mortality rates can lead to inefficiently high levels of child labor due
to uncertainty of education’s returns. Loretzen et al. (2005) find that increases in life
expectancy are associated with higher human capital investments. Since conflict affects
mortality rates, it also increases this uncertainty. Second, conflict can reduce the quality
of education by creating an unsafe environment for teachers and students leading to low
school attendance rates, and destroying infrastructure. Finally, conflict is believed to af-
fect economic performance in general, which can reduce labor opportunities for educated
workers.
Although there are some cross-country studies on the consequences of violent conflict
with mixed findings (Chen et. al 2007, Collier 1999, Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001), this
country-level perspective has been criticized because of its insufficient attention to the
impact of armed conflict on households and individuals (Verwimp, Justino and Brück
2009). Using micro-level data for Tajikistan, Shemyakina (2011) finds that the probability
of completing mandatory schooling was significantly reduced for women. Akresh and
de Walque (2008) investigates the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide on schooling
outcomes of children, using a difference in differences approach they find that children
exposed to the genocide experience a decline in school attendance and are less likely to
complete fourth grade.
For Colombia, Angrist and Kugler (2008) find that boys labor supply increased due
to the shift of production of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. Dueñas and
Sanchez (2007) find that the activities of illegal armed groups increase the risk of dropout
for all individuals, and this effect is stronger for the poorest households. Rodriguez and
Sánchez (2011) show that conflict induces children to drop out and to enter the labor
market too early. Barrera and Ibañez (2004) find a negative relationship between the
probability of school enrollment and contemporaneous homicide rate. However interesting
these results are, these studies use cross-section data, which has the usual limitations.
Moreover, the present study also differs from the previous ones because it studies the
effect of conflict on tow different types of child labor, housework and work performed
outside the household.
3 Data
I use two different panel data sets for this study. The one for Conflict is unique a daily
dataset from 1994 to 2012, and the one for Child Labor comes from a social program
intended for poor households in small municipalities6.
5Death or displacement of some relatives may induce an “added worker effect”. It can be directly,
increasing child labor supply in the market, or indirectly, increasing child housework. Justino (2011)
points out that households in conflict affected countries tend to replace dead, injured or physically and
mentally disabled adult workers with children, in order to compensate for income unexpected reductions.
6Population not larger than 100000 inhabitants by 2002
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3.1 Household Data
This data comes from Familias en Accion7, a social program implemented in Colom-
bia in 2002. This data set offers information about families characteristichs, decision
process and expectations, which allows getting insights about child labor decisions. The
household survey data coming from the Familias en Acción dataset includes information
on 57,764 individuals living in 9,526 poor households in 122 municipalities. Although
the surveys were designed mainly to evaluate the program, they collected information
on household living arrangements, economic conditions (income, assets, transfers to and
from the household, detailed family expenditures, external shocks and how the family
responded financially to these shocks). For individuals 10 and older, there is rich in-
formation on education and employment history, type and amount of payments, work
arrangements and conditions, time allocation per day, and expected and desired years of
schooling.
To be eligible for the program, households had to live in an eligible municipality.
Those municipalities were required to have at most 100000 inhabitants by 2002, access to
health services and basic education, a bank, and not be in the coffee zone. Within each
municipality, households registered with SISBEN (System for the Selection of Beneficia-
ries of Social Programs) were eligible8. A random and stratified selection of 55 treated
municipalities and 67 control municipalities, matched on geographic location, population,
and indices of quality of life, and school and health structure availability.9 Therefore, it is
feasible to assume that child labor trends would have been parallels had all municipalities
been equally affected by conflict.
I focus on the time use data on children between 10 and 17 years old. The sample
consists of 15314 children in 2002, 15198 in 2003, and 14102 in 2005. Around 53.2% of
the children are boys, 47.9% live in a rural area, 81.9% have at least one younger child
living in the same household, 82.5% of them live in a household whose head has some
kind of paid job, and live in a household with 2.77 adults on average.
The child labor variables used come from the time use data in this database. There
are two types of variables: dummy ones for whether a child works or not (for both the
two different types of child labor, and their sum)10, and the intensity variables measured
as the number of minutes dedicated to each type or work on the last business day.
Table 1 shows household and municipality controls descriptive statistics. On average
58.1% of the children between 10 and 17 years old do some kind work, 54.4% do more
housework than the median and 14.3%11 do more work outside the household than the
median. Moreover, children work, on average, around 121 minutes a day, 70.9 minutes of
housework and 51.16 of work outside the household but there is a considerable variation
7Families in the program were given subsidies, conditional upon nutrition and health check-ups for
children younger than 7 years old, and gives incentives for children to go to elementary school.
8Since these are poor households, this database provides a perfect setting for this study, since the
channels through which conflict can affect child labor suggested by the literature work almost exclusively
for this type of households that can not afford to migrate or take any other alternative to mitigate the
consequences of conflict.
9Most of the control municipalities were towns without a bank, hence they were not eligible for the
program’s first wave.
10A child is said to work if he or she dedicates more time than the median for each type of work.
11This low percentage is probably due to the fact that families might underreport this type of work
more than housework, since it can be perceived as more harmful.
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(a standard deviation of 164.32, 104.672, and 143.84 respectively). The reminder of the
table shows both household12 and municipality controls13 such as: age, sex, number of
adults in the household, a dummy for the presence of younger children, a dummy for
the employment status of the head of the household, a dummy for urban households,
municipality area, altitude, rainfall, population, number of Courts, number of Prosecutor
Offices, number of Attorneys Office, and an Erosion index.
Attrition is a concern for this database. Contact rate was 93.8% of the initial sample
for the first follow-up, and 83% for the second follow-up. This can cause problems if
conflict is related to this sample lost, more specifically if households living in highly
affected by conflict municipalities decided to migrate because of conflict.14 However,
since more risk averse households are more prone to both child labor and migrating due
to conflict, the estimates presented in this study can be seen as a lower bound of the
actual impact of conflict on child labor.
3.2 Conflict Data
Colombia has experienced one of the longest internal conflicts in the world. It began
by the creation of two left wing guerrilla groups in the 1960s, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) (Guigale et al.
2002). Landowners and drug lords started right wing paramilitary groups, United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), to protect themselves against these groups. By the
second half of the 1980s violence related to the narcotics business had increased. The
guerrilla became involved in this business as well, which intensified the ongoing conflict
(Harker and Meléndez 2008). Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have committed all
kinds of violent attacks against the state armed forces, national infrastructure, and the
civil population through kidnappings, population displacement, forced recruitment and
homicides (Rodríguez and Sánchez 2012).
Álvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia in 2002. “Democratic Security”, his
most popular policy, aimed to regain state control over the country’s territory. In or-
der to achieve this goal, military spending increased, expanding police presence to all
municipalities, trying to eradicate coca cultivation, fighting the guerrilla and demobiliz-
ing the AUC. This policy had mixed results, even though the number of kidnappings
and homicides decreased significantly, some of the AUC members formed the so-called
bandascriminales continue to participate in drug production and trafficking and attack
civil population.
The data set used in this study comes from a balanced panel of detailed event-based
data from the Center for the Study for Armed Conflict (CERAC), updated by Universidad
del Rosario. For every event the conflict dataset records its type, the date, location,
12Older children, with younger relatives within the household, living in rural areas with unemployed
head of the household are expected to be more likely to work. Moreover, the more adults a household
has, the less it should need extra work supply, ceteris paribus. Finally, a dummy for the head of the
household having at least some secondary education is also added, since the literature suggests this to be
an important determinant of the amount of education parents want for their children.
13Covariates to estimate conflict suggested by the literature on Colombia.
14A first approach shows that conflict seems to decrease the likelihood of a household being found both
in 2003 and 2005.
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perpetrator, and victims involved in the incident15from 1988 to 2012. Instruments are
taken from the Center of the Studies for Economic Development (CEDE) at Universidad
de los Andes.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the conflict variables and the instruments
for municipalities present in the household database. The measure of conflict used in this
study is a dummy variable that activates when the attack rate per 100000 inhabitants in
a each municipality is at least the median of the hole sample for a given year16. Specif-
ically, the total number of attacks is the sum of political terrorist attacks, illegal road
blockings, route blocking, explosive terrorist attacks, arsonist terrorist attacks, private
property assaults, entity terrorist attacks, armed contact, ambushes, harassing, popu-
lation incursions, land piracy, and other terrorist attacks. Table 2 shows that there is
enough variation of conflict measures both within municipalities thought time.
The instruments used in this study are measures of central government deterrence
effort: weapons seized and laboratories dismantle17. These have been suggested by the
literature18 on Colombian conflict as being strongly correlated with conflict measures
such as number of attacks. This also holds for the database used in this study, first
stage results are analyzed in the next section. Intuitively, these two variables should
be strongly and positively correlated with conflict variables because they indicate the
presence and effectiveness of the central government to neutralize illegal armed groups’
actions. Moreover, these instruments are believed to be exogenous to child labor, as
it’s unlikely that households decide their time use based on these central government
decisions, which are usually classified and take place in environments not easily detected
by the civil population. Likewise, most schooling policies are decided at the regional level,
and even those determined at the country level, are not taken by the same ministry than
those of deterrence effort, hence households’ decisions are not likely to be affected by the
instruments through any other channel than conflict.
4 Results
As mentioned above, this study uses three different approaches to estimate the effect of
conflict on both the parent’s decisions to make their children19 work and the amount of
time they do so (measured by number of minutes children dedicate to work in a given
day), differentiating the effects by gender, and by two types of work.
Given that this panel comes from a social program intended to improve health status
of the children in the household and to give incentives for parents to send their children to
elementary school, all regressions have as a control a dummy for the household receiving
15The dataset is described thoroughly by Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2004).
16It’s constructed that way due to a relatively high number of zeros of the attack rate variable.
17Controlling for geographical variables are included because they determine whether or not coca leaf
can be produced there. Institutional variables are added as a proxy of state institutional presence. These
variables are included because they are not affected by conflict.
18For example Camacho and Rodriguez (2010) use laboratories dismantle, and Lemus (2014) uses these
two as well.
19Assuming parents decide their children’s time allocation might not be entirely realistic, especially
for older children, but given the empirical nature and the scope of this study, this assumption is not
problematic.
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this aid, since treated households should be more prone to send their children to school,
this should decrease the likelihood of child labor.
Instrumentes are used becuase there is a possible endogeneity issue due to high partic-
ipation of children in war and due to possible selection of households into more “peaceful”
municipalities according to risk preferences. Table 9 presents the first stage regressions of
the instrumental variable (IV) approach to check how appropriate these instruments are.
Column 1 shows the results for the pooled sample using OLS, column 2 presents the first
stage of the probit estimation, and the third displays the results for the 2SLS fixed effects
estimation. For both specifications, both instruments significantly increase the measure
of conflict. Furthermore, the F-test shows that instruments are not weak, given that all
of them are greater than 10.
This section presents the results by work type, beginning with the full sample, followed
by those of housework, and ending with the ones for work outside the household.
4.1 General child labor
Table 3 presents the results for labor participation decision (all types of labor). Columns
(1) and (2) show the results for a linear probability model and a probit model respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) display the results for the same models controlling for the endogeneity
issue20. Children living in a highly affected by conflict municipality are more likely to do
some kind of work than those living in other municipalities. Moreover, it is worth noting
that the negative sign of the bias, meaning that not taking the endogeneity issue into
consideration would lead one to find that conflict reduces child labor when it actually
increases it. This fact might be explained by an omitted variable bias: risk aversion can
affect both households’ child labor/education decisions and their choices on the type of
municipality (more or less conflict) to live in. As the literature21 suggests, especially for
poor households, high risk aversion induces households to use their children’s’ labor force
as a way to reduce the risk of falling below a subsistence level of income. Hence, if more
risk averse households have migrated to more peaceful municipalities, they will also be
more likely to send their children to work which would explain why non-instrumented
results display a negative effect of conflict on child labor that would not actually come
from conflict itself but from an omitted variable, risk aversion.
Table 4 displays results for child labor intensity (as measured by the number of minutes
children work in a given day). Columns (1) and (3) present the results for the pooled
sample without and with instruments. Columns (2) and (4) show results for the fixed
effects 22 without and with instruments.
Now, conflict does not have a significant effect on the amount of time dedicated to
work when the fixed effects model is used, but it does has a significative effect for the
pooled sample. Moreover, most of the coefficients lose their statistical significance when
using a fixed effects specification, which means that most of the correlations captured by
these variables are not actually causal effects but come from differences in municipalities’
20Column (3) shows the 2SLS estimation for the linear model and column (4) presents the control
function estimators. The last one should be carefully interpreted since the endogenous regressor is a
binary variable, hence results of column (3) are preferred.
21See Grootaert & Kanbur (1995), and Belzil & Leonardi (2007)
22Both individual and year fixed effects.
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unobserved characteristics that do not vary with time, such as culture. 23 Then, not
taking this problem into account can lead to misleading results, such as overestimating
the effect of conflict on child labor when what’s actually making the difference is something
else.
Controls have the expected sign, and are usually significant in all but the 2SLS fixed
effects specifications.
Once again, it is worth noting that 2SLS specifications not only make conflict’s coeffi-
cients significant, but they also change their sign. This can be reflecting the endogeneity
problem of conflict measures.
4.2 Housework
Table 5 shows the result of estimating the same models as table 3 but for housework
decision. The same holds for tables 6 and 4, for housework intensity.
Results show that conflict significantly increases the likelihood of housework. However,
this effect comes from a significanty high increase of this type of work for girls but not
for boys. Both the number of adults and living in an urban area significantly reduce
the likelihood oh housework. Having at least one younger relative living in the same
household increases the likelihood of housework, and children living in a household with
a relatively high educated head are less likely to do housework.
Children living in municipalities with high indices of conflict do 189 additional min-
utes of housework on average than those in towns with less conflict. This effect seems
to come enterely from the female population, boys living in highly affected by conflict
municipalities do significantly less housework.
These increases in both the likelihood and intensity of housework for girls may be due
to the fact that conflict forces older women in the household to find a paying job, hence
girls replace them in their previous duties.
It should also be noted that even if head of the household’s education significantly
reduces both the likelihood and intensity of housework, its effect seems to be quite low,
which may be due to the fact that the populations targeted for the social program from
which these data comes from are very poor households and only 13.3% of them had at
least some secondary education.
4.3 Work outside the household
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the same models as tables 3 and 4 with work outside
the household as a dependent variable.
Conflict seems to increase the likelihood of a child doing this type of work by 32.8%,
and this result seems to be stronger for males.
The intensity of this type of child labor increases in the instrumented pooled sample
model, but this result is no longer significative when adding fixed effects. This shows once
again, the importance of being able to follow the same individuals over time. Moreover,
the fact that the likelihood does increase but the intensity does not could be showing that
23Different societies can have different points of view regarding child labor. For example, some might
value formal education more than others.
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households affected by conflict would have not need to nor want to send their children to
work but were forced to do so because of conflict.
Furthermore, it should be noted that even though both females and males are more
likely to work outside the house if they live in municipalities with a high amount of
conflict, the result is stroger for boys though not significative.
5 Conclusion
Colombia has one of the longest ongoing civil conflicts in the world. Moreover, this phe-
nomenon has been well documented, the panel of conflict at the municipality level has
detailed information which combined with a panel from a social program for poor fami-
lies allows to study the effect of conflict on child labor. Using an instrumental variable
approach to account for possible endogeneity of conflict measures, I find that conflict
increases the likelihood of child labor participation, and the intensity of housework. Fur-
thermore, the intensity of child labor and housework significantly increases due to conflict,
especially for girls. On the other hand, conflict also increases out of the household work
participation, but this time the effect is higher for boys than for girls.
The present study goes one step forward from previous studies in two ways: by differ-
entiating between housework and out of the household work, and by exploiting the panel
setting of the database. I find that conflict increases the likelihood of child labor. This
comes mainly through increases in children working outside the household, and affects
more males than females. Conflict also increases the probability of housework and the
amount of this type of work girls do. Moreover, having at least one younger relative in
the same household increases the probability of housework, especially for girls, and the
likelihood of work outside the household, especially for boys. These gender differences
are consistent with the traditional sex roles in Colombia.
These results contribute to the understanding of the consequences of conflict on house-
holds’ decisions, showing that there is yet another negative effect of this issue that should
be taken into consideration when estimating the social cost of conflict and the possible
gains from the end of it. They can also enrich the knowledge of governments to help them
design suitable policies to reduce the negative impacts of conflict on poor households, and
hence on economic development.
This is a relatively new research question and therefore further research, both theo-
retical and empirical, is needed to understand the effect of conflict on child labor and the
channels through which it acts. Moreover, it would be interesting to find better instru-
ments and to address the possible attrition problem that could be making the present
results underestimate the effect of conflict on child labor.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median q75 Min Max
Child Labor 43982 111.334 145.623 60 150 0 600
Child Labor° 43982 0.576
Housework 43922 68.617 96.232 30 120 0 600
Housework° 43922 0.560
Work outside house 43942 42.717 126.083 0 0 0 600
Work outside house° 43942 0.129
Attack rate 43982 3.741 8.657 0 3.732 0 73.752
Conflict° 43982 0.257
Youch° 43982 0.821
Urbr° 44561 0.485
Head hh education° 43982 0.133
HH head employment status° 43982 0.823
Sex° 43982 0.536
# Adults 43982 2.777 1.377 2 3 0 19
Age 43982 13.234 2.227 13 15 10 17
Area (km) 43821 739.372 1317.433 418 847 49 12114
Altitude 43821 632.336 770.536 180 1171 3 2746
Population 43821 28323.590 21801.540 22041 34809 1519 101987
Courts 43821 1.984 2.307 1 2 0 13
Prosecutor Office 43821 0.100 0.383 0 0 0 2
N_Attorneys Office 43821 1.359 2.248 0 2 0 13
Erosion 43821 1.802 0.852 1.710 2.39 0 5
Rainfall 43821 1688.771 882.834 1398 1980 300 4997
Weapons seized 43982 0.378 0.956 0 0 0 9
Laboratories dismantled 43982 0.425 1.857 0 0 0 21
°Dummy variables.  Source: IGAC, Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi, DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Conflict
Year Municipalities Individuals Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
2002 122 15101 4.05889 8.13039 0.271 0.4445 0.2561 0.7316 0.67449 1.8974
2003 122 15038 3.58647 9.7782 0.2442 0.4296 0.4402 1.0495 0.678 2.362
2005 122 13843 3.10049 7.06793 0.2119 0.4087 0.3738 0.9509 0.20552 0.6801
Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación,  CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO
100000 inhabitants dummy seized dismantle 
 Attack rate per Conflict Weapons Laboratories 
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 Table 3: Effect of conflcit on child labor decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict !0.016** !0.046** 0.125*** 0.366***
[0.008] [0.021] [0.034] [0.104]
Age 0.033*** 0.088*** 0.033*** 0.086***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
youch° 0.044*** 0.116*** 0.042*** 0.110***
[0.006] [0.016] [0.006] [0.016]
Head hh education° !0.054*** !0.143*** !0.055*** !0.143***
[0.007] [0.019] [0.007] [0.019]
ad_labor° 0.01 0.027* 0.008 0.022
[0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.016]
Urbr° !0.080*** !0.212*** !0.091*** !0.240***
[0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013]
Sex° !0.155*** !0.413*** !0.123*** !0.315***
[0.005] [0.014] [0.009] [0.029]
sex*conf° 0.006 0.02 !0.128*** !0.372***
[0.011] [0.029] [0.034] [0.104]
n_old !0.007*** !0.020*** !0.008*** !0.020***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005]
Observations 42371 42371 42371 42371
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
Table 4: Effect of conflcit on child labor intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict !2.396 -6.932 59.630*** 109.718
[2.057] [8.809] [11.467] [71.925]
Age 18.162*** -3.568 18.101*** -4.180*
[0.324] [3.197] [0.329] [2.498]
youch° 15.171*** 4.357 13.699*** 6.024
[1.600] [6.810] [1.625] [6.593]
Head hh education° !16.814*** !20.874***
[1.724] [1.747]
ad_labor° 6.248*** -234.749*** 5.352*** -171.604
[1.789] [75.960] [1.810] [126.864]
N_adult !0.736 -1.155 !1.521*** -1.528
[0.494] [1.341] [0.504] [1.289]
Sex° !32.764*** !42.521***
[1.414] [1.495]
Urbr° !9.077*** 4.368
[1.508] [3.064]
sex*conf° 6.067** -2.251 !50.843*** -118.286
[3.095] [5.002] [11.428] [71.927]
Observations 42371 42371 42371 42371
Number of individuals 21905 21905
Fixed Effects ✓ ✓
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
IV
IV
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 Table 5: Effect of conflcit on housework
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.008 -0.024 0.089*** 0.289**
[0.007] [0.022] [0.034] [0.115]
Age 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
youch° 0.015** 0.042** 0.016*** 0.045***
[0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.017]
Head hh education° -0.028*** -0.075*** -0.018** -0.047**
[0.007] [0.019] [0.007] [0.019]
ad_labor° -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008
[0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.017]
Urbr° -0.033*** -0.091*** -0.025*** -0.069***
[0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.014]
Sex° -0.277*** -0.727*** -0.254*** -0.645***
[0.005] [0.014] [0.009] [0.032]
sex*conf° -0.019* -0.046 -0.114*** -0.353***
[0.011] [0.029] [0.034] [0.114]
n_old -0.012*** -0.031*** -0.010*** -0.026***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005]
Observations 42312 42312 42312 42312
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
Table 6: Effect of conflcit on housework intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.165 -4.36 33.326*** 189.256***
[1.747] [6.923] [8.025] [54.726]
Age 5.631*** -1.348 5.599*** -2.246
[0.213] [2.139] [0.214] [1.898]
youch° 3.576*** 0.627 3.211*** 2.814
[1.132] [4.253] [1.141] [5.016]
Head hh education° -6.060*** -6.410***
[1.244] [1.255]
ad_labor° 2.659** -247.233*** 2.145* -136.565
[1.188] [76.463] [1.192] [96.379]
N_adult -1.450*** 0.38 -1.579*** 0.117
[0.324] [0.941] [0.327] [0.980]
Sex° -11.871*** -14.143***
[0.946] [0.999]
Urbr° -52.992*** -45.317***
[1.052] [2.105]
sex*conf° -1.707 6.262 -33.668*** -186.841***
[2.063] [5.362] [7.920] [54.726]
Observations 42312 42312 42312 42312
Number of individuals 21887 21887
Fixed Effects ✓ ✓
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
IV
IV
15
 Table 7: Effect of conflcit on work outside the household
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.010** -0.064* 0.058** 0.328**
[0.004] [0.034] [0.025] [0.154]
Age 0.030*** 0.151*** 0.030*** 0.148***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004]
youch° 0.027*** 0.166*** 0.024*** 0.150***
[0.004] [0.024] [0.004] [0.023]
Head hh education° -0.030*** -0.208*** -0.037*** -0.242***
[0.004] [0.029] [0.004] [0.029]
ad_labor° 0.006 0.035* 0.005 0.028
[0.004] [0.021] [0.004] [0.021]
Urbr° -0.055*** -0.279*** -0.072*** -0.366***
[0.003] [0.018] [0.003] [0.018]
Sex° 0.118*** 0.638*** 0.132*** 0.709***
[0.003] [0.020] [0.007] [0.038]
sex*conf° 0.024*** 0.123*** -0.035 -0.23
[0.007] [0.041] [0.026] [0.153]
n_old 0.002 0.007 0 0.001
[0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006]
Observations 42333 42333 42333 42333
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
Table 8: Effect of conflcit on work outside the household intenstity 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -2.357* -2.645 25.611*** -81.431
[1.419] [5.195] [9.599] [60.912]
Age 12.555*** -2.319 12.527*** -2.004
[0.292] [2.345] [0.294] [2.112]
youch° 11.572*** 3.875 10.479*** 3.355
[1.300] [5.258] [1.308] [5.572]
Head hh education° -10.825*** -14.527***
[1.358] [1.361]
ad_labor° 3.548** 12.306*** 3.176** -36.215
[1.557] [4.209] [1.569] [107.242]
N_adult 0.7 -1.602 0.047 -1.698
[0.429] [1.067] [0.433] [1.090]
Sex° -21.017*** -28.429***
[1.217] [1.277]
Urbr° 43.784*** 49.433***
[1.286] [2.605]
sex*conf° 7.868*** -8.629 -16.536* 70.258
[2.676] [5.859] [9.650] [60.912]
Observations 42333 42333 42333 42333
Number of individuals 21897 21897
Fixed Effects ✓ ✓
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets.**p<0.05 ***p<0.01.Source:  IGAC,
DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary, CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. 
Author's calculations.
IV
IV
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 Table 9: First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3)
Weapons seized 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.021***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
Laboratories dismantled 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.051***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.007]
Observations 42371 42371 42977
F-excluded Instruments 167.07 12.14
p-value 0.000 0.000
Fixed effects ✓
Note: Robust standard errors in brakets. **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.  
Source:  IGAC, DANE, DNP, Superior Court of the Judiciary,
CEDE, CERAC/UROSARIO. Author's calculations.
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